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Nontechnical Summary 
Older workers frequently have difficulties to find new work after unemployment. 
In 1998, the German government introduced the Integration Supplement for 
Older Workers (Eingliederungszuschuss für ältere Arbeitnehmer, EGZ), hiring 
subsidies targeted at workers aged 50 and above. Compared to hiring subsidies in 
other countries, the Integration Supplement is a generous program. According to 
the rules applying during the observation period, up to 50 per cent of standard-
ized labor costs could be paid over an interval of 24 months.  
This study is part of the evaluation of the “Hartz laws” commissioned by the 
German Federal Ministry of Labor and Economic Affairs. We examine whether 
eligibility to the program increases the chances to make the transition from 
unemployment to employment. The effect of eligibility on the transition rate into 
employment has been studied less frequently than the effect of actual subsidy 
receipt on integration into unsubsidized employment. However, the former effect 
is a precondition for the latter: if the availability of subsidies does not change 
hiring behavior, there is no reason why subsidies should affect individual 
transitions into unsubsidized employment. 
To estimate the effect of eligibility, we use two changes in the legal rules. Our 
first set of estimates is based on an extension of the group of eligible unemployed 
persons introduced in 2002. Our second set of estimates validates these results by 
evaluating the unification of the Integration Supplement for Older Workers and 
the general Integration Supplement in 2004, which made workers aged above and 
below 50 years of age equally eligible to subsidy receipt. In both cases, we 
compare the transition rate from unemployment to employment of a group of 
workers affected by the change (workers aged 50) with a similar but unaffected 
group (workers aged 49) during the first 180 days of unemployment.  
Data from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), an administrative data 
set collected and provided by the German Federal Employment Agency, are 
used. The data cover all unemployed individuals, which is important to forming 
treatment and control groups of appropriate sizes.  
Estimates from duration analysis of the transition rate show that, for the popula-
tion as a whole, the probability of leaving unemployment and entering employ-
ment is unaffected by the availability of hiring subsidies. For women in East 
Germany, however, extending eligibility led to an increase in exit from unem-
ployment by six percentage points, while the ending of the specific subsidy 
program for older workers lowered their employment chances by about two 
percentage points. Further analysis shows that the ineffectiveness for most 
population groups is due to deadweight effects: an increase in subsidized hirings 
is accompanied by a decline in unsubsidized new employment.  
 
  
Do Hiring Subsidies Reduce Unemployment Among the 
Elderly? Evidence From Two Natural Experiments  
 
Bernhard Boockmann* 
Thomas Zwick  
Andreas Ammermüller 
Michael Maier 
 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
P.O. Box 10 34 43 
D-68034 Mannheim 
Abstract: We estimate the effects of hiring subsidies for older workers on transitions 
from unemployment to employment in Germany. Using a natural experiment, our first 
set of estimates is based on a legal change extending the group of eligible unemployed 
persons. A subsequent legal change in the opposite direction is used to validate these 
results. Our data cover the population of unemployed jobseekers in Germany and was 
specifically made available for our purposes from administrative data. Consistent 
support for an employment effect of hiring subsidies can only be found for women in 
East Germany. Concerning other population groups, firms´ hiring behavior is hardly 
influenced by the program and hiring subsidies mainly lead to deadweight effects. 
JEL-Codes: J 64, H 24, C 31 
Key Words: Hiring subsidies, older workers, evaluation, natural experiments 
Acknowledgements: This study was conducted as part of the evaluation of the propos-
als of the Hartz Commission. We wish to thank the former Federal Ministry of the 
Economy and Labor (BMWA) for financial support. All results and opinions are our 
own and do not represent those of the BMWA or its successors. We wish to thank 
Bernd Fitzenberger, Christian Göbel, Reinhard Hujer, Michael Lechner, and Conny 
Wunsch for helpful comments and Christoph Junkert for competent research assistance.  
*Corresponding author. Tel.: +49-621-1235-156, Fax: +49-621-1235-225, E-mail: 
boockmann@zew.de.  
 1
1 Introduction 
Among active labor market policies for disadvantaged labor market groups, 
hiring subsidies1 play an important role in most OECD countries (Martin and 
Grubb, 2001). Examples are programs within the New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP) in the UK (Blundell et al., 2004; van Reenen, 2004), the Targeted Jobs 
Tax Credit, Work Opportunity or Welfare to Work Tax Credit programs in the 
USA (Katz, 1998; Hamersma, 2005), or the Special Youth Employment and 
Training Program in Australia (Knight, 2002). The object of hiring subsidies is to 
increase demand for workers from the target group, thereby raising their em-
ployment rates and earnings. Theoretically, the employment effects of these 
subsidies are well understood (Katz, 1998). The empirical evidence, however, 
differs between programs, countries and time periods and is frequently plagued 
by data and estimation problems.  
This paper presents estimation results for the effect of the Integration Sup-
plement, a hiring subsidy in Germany, on subsequent exit from unemployment. 
We concentrate on older employees as a disadvantaged group on the labor 
market. These workers are often perceived by companies as less productive and 
less flexible and yet more costly to employ than younger workers. As a conse-
quence, unemployment rates, unemployment durations and wage losses after 
unemployment are relatively high among older workers.  
 Our study extends the empirical evidence in several ways. First, we use a 
natural experiment to identify the effect of eligibility for subsidies on the dura-
tion of unemployment. For credible identification, we use treatment and control 
groups that differ only to a very small degree with respect to age and are identical 
with respect to other observable characteristics. The effect of eligibility on the 
transition rate into employment has been studied less frequently than the effect of 
actual subsidy receipt on integration into unsubsidized employment. However, 
the former effect is a precondition for the latter: if the availability of subsidies 
does not change hiring behavior, there is no reason why subsidies should affect 
individual transitions into unsubsidized employment. Second, by using two 
changes that first relaxed and later tightened criteria for eligibility, we can 
                                              
1  Hiring subsidies should be distinguished from wage subsidies. According to Orszag and Snower 
(2003), hiring subsidies are targeted at the unemployed and provided only for a limited period of 
time while wage subsidies are paid to employers for an indefinite period and are meant to pro-
mote employment for all workers below a certain wage level. 
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validate the estimated effects of each change and assess the credibility of identi-
fication. Third, we derive a measure of deadweight effects by comparing the 
estimated employment effect to the number of subsidies disbursed. Our study is 
based on official register data from the German Federal Employment Agency. 
This data contains detailed information at the individual level. It is otherwise 
unavailable for evaluation purposes and has been drawn specifically for our 
study.2 The data cover all unemployed individuals, which is important to forming 
treatment and control groups of appropriate sizes.  
In the next section, we state our main research question and review the 
empirical literature. We then describe the Integration Supplement for Older 
Workers in detail and place it into the context of German active labor market 
policies. Next, we introduce the data. Section five outlines our estimation 
approach. Empirical results are presented in section six. We provide some 
robustness checks in the seventh section, while a summary of the implications 
from our findings is contained in the final section.  
 
2 Research question and previous empirical evidence 
Hiring subsidies raise two different policy questions that should be distinguished 
(Martin, 2000; Marx, 2001):  
(1) Does program participation lead to a higher probability of being in unsub-
sidized employment in the future as compared to non-participation?  
(2) Do hiring subsidies lead to more hirings and, hence, to earlier transitions 
from unemployment to (subsidized or unsubsidized) employment among 
eligible persons, as compared to the situation in which no subsidies are 
available? 
The first question is asked in most evaluation studies on active labor market 
policies in general, and hiring subsidies in particular. In this paper, we are 
exclusively concerned with the second question which has been analyzed less 
often in the literature. It can be seen as a precondition for evaluating the effects 
of subsidized hiring on regular employment because it concerns hiring behavior 
of firms as a reaction to the availability of the subsidies. If hiring behavior is 
                                              
2  Access to the data has been granted to several research institutes evaluating the effects of the so-
called “Hartz reforms” under commission by the German Federal Ministry of Labor and Economic 
Affairs. The data and files used for statistical analysis are stored at the Institute for Employment 
Research (IAB) of the Federal Employment Agency. 
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unaffected by the subsidy, there is no meaningful treatment at the individual 
level, the effects of which could be estimated. In our case, treatment is defined as 
the eligibility for program participation, not actual program participation, and the 
outcome is the time it takes to exit from unemployment to employment. A 
natural experiment design is used to estimate treatment effects, based on two 
changes to eligibility described in detail in the third section.  
There are different reasons why subsidies may fail to induce additional 
hirings and shorten unemployment durations.3 Hiring subsidies lower net wages 
paid by the employer for the time the benefits are paid. The strength of the 
employment effect depends on the wage elasticities of labor demand and supply 
(Katz, 1998; Bell et al., 1999). If either is inelastic, the subsidy will not enhance 
employment of workers eligible to the subsidy. The only effect is that employers 
or employees benefit financially, depending on which side reacts inelastically. 
This outcome has been termed a deadweight effect (de Koning, 1993; Meyer, 
1995). A deadweight effect occurs if employers collect the subsidy but hire the 
same individuals they would have hired had the subsidy not been available. 
Assessing the magnitude of deadweight effects is a main objective of our 
empirical analysis.  
Even if subsidies are effective for employment of eligible workers, they 
may be ineffective for total employment. Improvements in employment chances 
of eligible persons could be countered by a worsening of prospects among other 
groups (Bell et al., 1999; Blundell et al., 2004; Martin, 2000; OECD, 1990). 
Crowding-out could take the form of substitution if unsubsidized workers are laid 
off while subsidized workers with otherwise similar characteristics are hired. 
Moreover, displacement effects may occur if, for instance, firms using subsidized 
employment take the place of competitors not using subsidized employment.  
With singular exceptions such as the unemployment insurance bonus ex-
periments analyzed by Meyer (1995), existing studies universally rely on non-
experimental variation. Regarding the effects on unsubsidized employment (the 
first policy question stated above), statistical matching is frequently applied. A 
control group of unsubsidized workers or persons out of work is generated to 
construct the counterfactual of non-treatment for individuals for whom hirings 
subsidies are paid (Lorenz, 1988; Hollenbeck and Willke, 1991; Jaenichen, 2002; 
                                              
3  Reasons not discussed here are that financial incentives are too low, administrative costs are too 
high, or companies are unaware of the subsidy program (Marx, 2001). The presence of these 
reasons can best be detected in implementation studies (see section 4 below). 
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Knight, 2002; Sianesi, 2003; Forslund et al., 2004; Hamersma, 2005; Cockx and 
Göbel, 2005). There are a number of problems with this approach: the likely 
presence of unobservable differences between treatment and control group, 
selectivity in the decision who is subsidized, and changes in the composition of 
the groups over time (Katz, 1998).4  
 Among existing studies for exit from unemployment (the second policy 
question), some are based on opinion surveys among employers or compare 
employment increases in firms that knew about the subsidies with those that were 
not aware of them (Perloff and Wachter, 1979; Bishop, 1981). The latter ap-
proach is problematic because firms with growing employment have a greater 
incentive to learn about the program. More recent non-experimental studies use 
differences in (changes in) regional availability of subsidies (Blundell et al., 
2004; Frölich and Lechner, 2004; Forslund et al., 2004; Schmid, 1979). The 
results of these studies critically hinge on the assumption that the variation in the 
availability of subsidies is determined exogenously.   
 More similar to our approach, Katz (1998) uses a natural experiment to 
assess the effect of hiring subsidies on unemployment durations. He examines a 
policy change that made economically disadvantaged 23-24 years olds ineligible 
to a major U.S. wage subsidy program, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), 
while those aged 18-22 years maintained eligibility. A so called “difference-in-
differences-in-differences” estimator is applied which, in addition to time and 
age groups, is based on the differences between disadvantaged and non-
disadvantages youths. A drawback of this study is that the data set used, the 
March Current Population Survey (CPS), only includes information on the labor 
market status for one day per year. If labor market participants in a certain age 
group have shorter employment spells than others, there may be distortions in the 
observed employment patterns. Moreover, as mentioned by Katz (1998), the 
estimated modest positive employment effects may be overshadowed by the 
elimination of the TJTC subsidy for a second year of employment a year earlier. 
                                              
4  A number of studies compare the effectiveness of hiring subsidies with other programs. 
Heckman et al. (1999) conclude that the employment impact of different active labor market 
policies is similar and small. Martin and Grubb (2001) and Sianesi (2003) stress that hiring 
subsidies paid to private employers have a greater impact on employment than public training 
programs or job creation schemes. However, these favorable assessments may partly be due to 
possible overestimation of the employment effect by the matching estimator, as discussed above. 
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Van Reenen (2004) also uses a natural experiment approach to evaluate 
the British New Deal for Young People. After receiving job seeker allowance for 
six months, 19-24 year old unemployed individuals are given a choice between 
four options: full-time education or training, a job for six months with a volun-
tary sector employer, a job with the Environmental Task Force, or a subsidy to a 
prospective employer for six months plus training. Van Reenen estimates the 
combined effect of all measures by calculating the differences in the outflows 
from unemployment between periods, age groups and pilot and non-pilot areas. 
The results – an increase in the monthly job finding probability by about 20 per 
cent – are robust with respect to the control group chosen and the inclusion of 
further controls. The results may be overestimated because they may contain 
program introduction effects and the effects of the individual measures cannot be 
distinguished. However, the robustness of the results with respect to the duration 
of new jobs, the kind of job, the age definitions of treatment and control group 
and the presence of Ashenfelter’s dip is carefully checked. 
 The natural experiment approach used in this paper extends the ones by 
Katz (1998) and Van Reenen (2004) in several respects. First, we use spell data 
with daily frequency. This allows us to see how the employment effects of hiring 
subsidies evolve over time. Second, treatment and control groups are very similar 
in age, which raises the credibility of the identifying assumptions of the differ-
ence-in-differences estimator. Third, we compare results from two contrary 
natural experiments and check their consistency. Fourth, we provide evidence for 
deadweight effects. Finally, we offer extensive robustness checks of our esti-
mates.   
3 Description of hiring subsidies in Germany 
In this paper, we are concerned with the Integration Supplement (Einglied-
erungszuschuss, EGZ), a hiring subsidy paid to the employer over a fixed period 
of time. The Integration Supplement has been available from 1998 to support the 
hiring of workers with unfavorable labor market characteristics. With a total 
spending volume of 0.9 to 1.3 billion € per year, it is one of the major active 
labor market programs in Germany, accounting for roughly 5 per cent of all 
active labor market spending. 
Until 1998, there were several parallel programs. Since 1998, all subsidy 
programs other than the newly introduced Integration Supplement (EGZ) have 
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been gradually phased out.5 The number of participants increased markedly after 
1998 and reached a high in February 2003, when more than 160,000 workers 
were employed in a contract supported by the EGZ (see Figure 1). As in other 
active labor market programs, the number of participants has declined more 
recently.  
The EGZ is paid to the employer as a percentage of standardized labor 
costs defined as the gross wage rate (as laid down in collective agreements) plus 
a lump-sum allowance for employer contributions to social security. If the 
employment relationship is terminated before a minimum period after the 
expiration of the subsidy, the employer is legally obliged to refund parts of the 
subsidy, although local employment agencies often refrain from enforcing this 
requirement. 
There is no legal claim to EGZ either by the worker or the employer. 
Rather, placement officers at the local employment agencies decide on program 
participation. The purpose of the EGZ is to facilitate hiring of persons with 
individual disadvantages on the labor market. In 1998, three variants of the EGZ 
were defined: EGZ while adapting to the new job, EGZ for workers with place-
ment difficulties and EGZ for older workers. Initially, the law defined older 
workers as workers above the age of 55, but this limit was reduced to 50 years.  
Benefit duration and volume differ for these groups. According to the 
rules applying during the observation period, older workers were eligible to the 
highest amount of subsidies. The regular subsidy was defined as 50 per cent of 
standardized labor costs, paid over an interval of 24 months. If a specific reason 
could be provided, the amount could be increased to 70 per cent and the duration 
of payment extended to at most 70 months (the share of subsidy payments in 
wage costs had to be reduced after 24 months, however). In general, German 
hiring subsidies are generous compared to subsidies in other countries (Bell et 
al., 1999). 
Concerning the eligibility of older workers to the EGZ subsidies, two ma-
jor changes were made in 2002 and 2004. Both of them are used as natural 
experiments in this paper. Before January 1st, 2002, the EGZ for older workers 
could only be paid in case of hiring of a person who had been either long-term 
                                              
5  An exception is the Integration Supplement for Start-up Companies (Eingliederungszuschuss bei 
Neugründung, EZN). 
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unemployed6 or had been registered as unemployed for at least six months during 
the 12 months before hiring. From January 1st, 2002, hiring of all unemployed 
workers above the age of 50 could potentially be subsidized by the EGZ.  
As part of a legislative package known as “Hartz laws” in Germany, the 
separate EGZ program for older workers was ended by January 1st, 2004. 
Depending on local employment agencies’ policies, workers below this threshold 
had now the same chances to be supported by EGZ subsidies. As a consequence, 
the share of individuals aged between 50 and 55 among all workers subsidized by 
EGZ declined from 19.1 to 13.3 per cent between 2003 and 2005 (ZEW, IAB and 
IAT, 2005: Statistical Appendix). 
Importantly for the identification of causal effects, these changes were the 
only ones affecting the age groups at the time. A change did occur with the 
introduction of the Income Safeguarding Program (Entgeltsicherung, Egs), 
taking effect from January 1st, 2003. Since the program applies to all workers 
aged 50 or above, the age limit is the same as for the EGZ subsidies. However, 
the date of introduction differs from the changes under consideration here. 
Regarding other changes in policies affecting older individuals, both the age 
threshold and the introduction date differ from the change to the EGZ subsidy.  
An implementation study based on case studies from 10 local employment 
agencies and 84 telephone interviews with company representatives concludes 
that there is substantial scope for decision-making at the local level concerning 
the allocation of the subsidy to a particular company for employment of a 
particular worker, the amount and the duration of benefits (ZEW, IAB and IAT, 
2005). In the majority of cases, an initial contact between a worker and an 
employer already existed and the employment agencies reacted to the company’s 
inquiries about whether the employment of a particular worker could be subsi-
dized. In these cases, the suspicion that subsidies are ineffective for hiring is 
high. Moreover, about half of the companies who had received EGZ in the past 
                                              
6  The definition of long-term unemployment is contained in § 18 of the German Social Code, 
Volume III: “(1) The long term unemployed are individuals unemployed for at least one year.  
(2) As regards benefits of active labor market policies, the following interruptions of unemploy-
ment are not considered within a five-year period: 1. periods in active labor market programmes, 
2. periods of sickness or maternity leave, 3. periods used for child-rearing or care for depend-
ants, 4. employment or self-employment up to a duration of six months, 5. periods during which 
employment was legally impossible, and 6. short interruptions without further evidence.” (own 
translation)  
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responded that their hiring behavior had not been affected by the EGZ. Overall, 
the implementation study strongly confirms the notion that deadweight effects 
are a major issue for the effectiveness of German hiring subsidies.  
4 The data 
The evaluation is based on the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), an 
administrative data set assembled and provided by the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency. Detailed information on a random sample from the IEB can be 
found in Hummel et al. (2005). Since our study was conducted as part of an 
official evaluation of the “Hartz laws”, we had access to the population of 
individuals entering unemployment. 
The IEB are composed of the following four separate data bases:  
• The Employment Register (BeH) is composed of the compulsory reports 
to the public pension system of German companies on the start, change or 
end of all employment relationships. Different forms of employment, such 
as regular work, marginal employment or employment in vocational train-
ing schemes, can be distinguished.  
• The Benefit Claimants Register (LeH) unifies data on the receipt of un-
employment benefit or (former) unemployment assistance and the subsis-
tence allowance paid in cases of sickness.  
• The Program-Participants Comprehensive Data Base (MTG) provides 
information on participation in active labor market programs, such as sub-
sidized employment (including EGZ), training schemes, the bridging al-
lowance for start-up companies by the unemployed and other programs.  
• The Job Applicant Files (BewA) is the most comprehensive data base on 
the characteristics of all registered job seekers. It contains all statistical in-
formation available to job centers when placement decisions are made.  
 
All of the information contained in the data set is collected daily. From the 
information on age, date of entry into unemployment and (for the 2002 case) 
previous unemployment durations, the data set of unemployment spells is 
constructed. Unemployment is defined as registered unemployment, irrespective 
of unemployment benefit receipt. To classify individuals as long-term or short-
term unemployed in the legal sense, we trace previous employment states in the 
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data. The complexity of the legal definition of long-term unemployment can only 
be approximated. However, the approximation seems to work well.7  
 Originating from different sources, the data are not always consistent. In 
particular, we found that not all workers found to be subsidised by EGZ in the 
MTG are reported to be in regular employment according to the BeH. In these 
cases, we have given precedence to the information from the MTG since the 
employer may have reported a hiring to the pension insurance belatedly. In cases 
of parallel spells of employment and unemployment or benefit receipt, we have 
given precedence to the latter piece of information. 
 In counting episodes as employment, and, hence, constructing exit from 
unemployment, we exclude participation in active labor market programs of 
other kinds, such as Employment Creation Schemes (ABM), Structural Adjust-
ment Measures (SAM) or training programs. Individuals may be in subsidized 
employment as well as participate in other programs. If participation in these 
programs differs according to age groups, this may distort the outcome measure 
unless employment spells that coincide with program participation are elimi-
nated. Moreover, employment effects of hiring subsidies can only be isolated 
from spells that do not coincide with other programs. Therefore, all employment 
spells starting at the same date (with two days tolerance) as a spell in active labor 
market programs are eliminated from the data. 
5 Estimation approach 
To estimate the causal effect of treatment, we use the difference-in-differences 
estimator, based on the extension of eligibility to individuals with short unem-
ployment durations in 2002 and the integration of the EGZ subsidy for older 
workers into the general EGZ framework in 2004. In both cases, the control 
group consists of workers below 50 years of age and, hence, never eligible to the 
EGZ for Older Workers. The change in the estimated transition probabilities 
between the two time periods is determined for the treatment and the control 
group and the difference between both changes is calculated. An alternative 
would be regression discontinuity design based on the age threshold. However, 
there are other reasons why transitions to employment could make a step at the 
                                              
7  There are only 11 cases of individuals receiving the EGZ for Older Workers who were ineligible 
according to our definition of long-term unemployment. Moreover, in most cases, individuals were 
ineligible according to any legally possible definition of long-term unemployment. 
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age threshold, such as the Income Safeguarding Program (Egs) and, possibly, 
hiring policies in the public and private sector. 
Continuous-time duration models are used to specify the outcome vari-
able. Hence, we avoid choosing an observation date arbitrarily, which could be 
non-representative for the whole observation period. Moreover, duration analysis 
allows us to assess how the employment effect evolves over the 180 days during 
which unemployment spells are observed. The failure event is taken to be a 
transition into employment (in the definition given in the previous section).  
In order to avoid length-bias, the sampling principle in our study is flow 
sampling. We observe a three months entry cohort of unemployed persons over a 
period of up to 180 days of their unemployment spell (see Figure 2). In the first 
natural experiment, we use data on all persons entering unemployment between 
April 1st and June 30th in either 2001 (pre-change) or 2002 (after the change). In 
the second natural experiment, we include individuals becoming unemployed 
between April 1st and June 30th, 2003 or 2004, respectively. All spells are 
treated as right censored after 180 days of unemployment. The reason is that, in 
the first natural experiment, individuals in the treatment group with more than six 
months of unemployment duration had been eligible for the subsidy even before 
the policy change. In the second case, data availability limits the period during 
which transitions into employment can be observed.  
Four distinct groups are defined: workers aged 50 to 50 plus six months at 
the time of entering unemployment and workers aged between 49 and 49 plus six 
months, both before and after the program change.8 A difference between the two 
natural experiments is that in the first case, individuals with previous unemploy-
ment durations above the legal threshold of long-term unemployment are 
excluded because they are not affected by the policy change. 
We use the time varying unconditional effect obtained from Kaplan-
Meier-Survivor functions. The Kaplan Meier survivor function (DD) estimates 
the probability of remaining in unemployment τ days after the beginning of the 
unemployment spell. The DD effect is defined as: 
    , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .h t h t k t k tDD S S S S= = = =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤τ = τ − τ − τ − τ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (1) 
Here, for example, , 1ˆ ( )h tS = τ  is the survivor function (the estimated probability of 
remaining in unemployment) in the treatment group at 1t = , where t refers to the 
                                              
8  The effects of changes in the definition of the groups are discussed in section 8.  
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periods before (0) and after (1) the change. The subscripts h and k indicate 
membership of the treatment and control groups.9 
 Equation (1) implies that the causal effect is estimated for every point in 
time τ. Accounting for changes in the effect of the subsidy is important because 
subsidies may not be disbursed immediately after entry into unemployment. 
Alternatively, they could accelerate hirings such that the effect is larger at the 
start than towards the end of the observation period. To calculate standard errors, 
we use a bootstrapping procedure drawing 300 resamples. For each resample, all 
effects are recomputed. A 95 per cent confidence interval is defined using the 
0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of all realizations of the effects for every single day. 
That is, pointwise confidence intervals are constructed. 
To estimate deadweight effects, we compare the estimated effects of the 
program changes on exit to employment with the corresponding change in the 
starts of subsidy payments. If both are equal, all subsidized hirings are additional 
and there are no deadweight effects. If the latter effect exceeds the former, some 
of the subsidized hirings are not additional in the targeted group of workers. 
Since the distinction between both exit states requires a competing risks frame-
work, we use the cumulative incidence function instead of the Kaplan-Meier 
estimate: 
    , , 1 , , 0 , , 1 , , 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j h t j h t j k t j k tDD F F F F= = = =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤τ = τ − τ − τ − τ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (2) 
where ( ) Pr( , )jF T J jτ = ≤ τ =  is the cumulative incidence function, j is the 
destination state and T is the exit date. Unlike Kaplan-Meier estimates calculated 
for the risks separately, the risk-specific ( )jF τ  sum to the total cumulative 
incidence functions for all risks taken together (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002: 
252). The destination states j are exit into a job subsidized by EGZ and exit into 
unsubsidized employment. If deadweight effects are complete, the difference-in-
differences estimations of the cumulative incidence functions into both types of 
work should have the same magnitudes but opposite directions. If there are no 
                                              
9  A generalization of the difference-in-differences estimator that takes into account heterogeneity in the 
distribution of unobservables between treatment and control groups has been proposed by Athey and 
Imbens (2006). Since we have chosen treatment and control groups as narrow age groups that are 
very close to each other, we regard the issue of unobserved heterogeneity (and indeed, observed 
heterogeneity as well, see section 7) as not important to our application. Moreover, the Athey and 
Imbens estimator is not directly implementable to continuous duration models.  
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deadweight effects, all new employment subsidized by the EGZ should be 
additional in the group of subsidized workers. Hence, unsubsidized exits should 
be unaffected. 
 
6 Results 
Before the employment effects of the change in eligibility conditions are ex-
plored, we first track their effects on the number of subsidized employment 
relationships in the data. If the share of subsidies disbursed remained unchanged, 
any changes in employment could not be attributed to the legal changes in 2002 
and 2004. The numbers in Table 1 represent the number of exits into subsidized 
employment over the number of spells. They refer to all EGZ subsidies, whether 
specifically designed for older workers or for other labor market groups. The 
table shows that the change in admission criteria in 2002 resulted in a strong 
increase in the share of supported workers in the treatment group. For the year 
2004, we observe the opposite effect – the share of subsidies for the treatment 
group was reduced more strongly than that of the control group. Hence, the legal 
changes did have a considerable effect on actual participation in the program in 
both cases. 
 To give an indication of the probability of exit into employment, table 2 
contains the Kaplan-Meier survivor function up to 180 days after entry into 
unemployment in the four groups and each of the two natural experiments. 
Owing to the fact that the long-term unemployed are excluded in 2001/2002, the 
survivor function is lower for these years. After about half a year, between 18 
and 28 per cent of the unemployed had taken up employment. The probability of 
exit is slightly lower for the older age group. However, the differences depend on 
the year in which they are measured, and the confidence bands overlap in most 
cases. Therefore, the differences between treatment and control group are small.  
On the basis of the estimated survivor function, we calculate the DD esti-
mators for all durations τ according to equation (1). Figures 3 and 4 show the 
results. Regarding the extension of eligibility in 2002, the estimated effect on 
survival in unemployment is negative as expected. Conversely, the end of the 
separate program for older workers in 2004 led to an increase in the probability 
of remaining unemployed, which is also in line with expectations. However, the 
effects are not monotonic and, judged by the bootstrapped confidence intervals, 
not statistically significant.  
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Separate estimations for four population groups, men and women in East 
and West Germany, show striking differences (Figures 5 and 6). Women in East 
Germany are the only group where there is any significant effect in 2002. The 
DD-estimate is large: at τ = 180, exit rises by 6 percentage points. All other 
groups did not experience any changes in re-employment probabilities. Regard-
ing the program change in 2004, the effects also differ between men and women. 
With up to three percentage points, the effects on women are again relatively 
large. However, they are significant only for East German females, and only for 
parts of of the duration. Contrary to expectation, the estimated effects on West 
German males indicate an improvement in the probability of exit from unem-
ployment. However, the effect is not significant.  
 The time-varying nature of the estimated effects also permits an assess-
ment concerning the relevance of Ashenfelter’s dip (Ashenfelter, 1978). There is 
a possible anticipation effect concerning the eligibility to subsidized hiring after 
six months of unemployment in the period before the policy change in 2002. In 
the expectation that subsidies would soon be available, employers may have been 
reluctant to hire workers shortly before the start of eligibility (i.e., shortly before 
they became long-term unemployed). This may result in a low exit rate before the 
policy change in the treatment group and, therefore, to a spurious difference-in-
differences effect close to the end of the 6-months period. However, the time 
pattern of the estimated effects of the subsidy does not exhibit an increase 
towards the end of the observation period. Hence, Ashenfelter’s dip does not 
seem to be an issue here. 10 
Next, we turn to the magnitude of the deadweight effects. The small size 
of the effects on employment does not necessarily speak against the effectiveness 
of the program provided that the number of subsidy starts is equally low. Figures 
7 and 8 show difference-in-differences based on the cumulative incidence 
functions, i.e. the DDj effects according to equation (2), for all groups taken 
together and for the natural experiments taking place in 2002 and 2004. Note that 
compared to the previous graphs, the interpretation of the curve differs: a positive 
number means an increase in the probability of exit, not of survival in unem-
ployment. The graphs show that both changes to the legal eligibility criteria had 
                                              
10  A second anticipation effect concerns unemployed persons at the age threshold of eligibility. 
Being targeted at workers above 50, program design may induce firms to postpone hiring of an 
individual until his or her 50th birthday. We take up this point in the re-definition of age groups 
(see section 7 below). 
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relatively large effects on subsidized employment in the treatment group. 
Measured as shares among all unemployed persons, they amount to a two 
percentage point increase in 2002 and a one to two percentage point decline in 
2004. This is much larger than the DD effect on employment. The difference 
between the two consists of exits into unsubsidized employment, which are 
influenced negatively by the availability of subsidies. Hence, deadweight effects 
dominate.  
Separate analyses for the four population groups (not included here) show 
that unsubsidized hirings decline in the same proportion as subsidized hirings 
occur among all groups except East German women. Unsubsidized hirings are 
unaffected among East German women. The magnitudes of the estimated 
employment effects are in all cases reasonable given the amount of subsidies paid 
out. In particular, the estimated employment effect should not be larger than the 
effect of the changes in eligibility on subsidies disbursed in the treatment group.  
 Overall, the results point at the absence of any effects of the subsidy 
program on exits from unemployment in most groups of the population. They 
suggest that employers reduced unsubsidized hiring by almost the same amount 
as they received subsidies. However, consistently positive effects are found for 
East German women. The chances of leaving unemployment among East 
German women improved vis-à-vis the control group when eligibility was 
extended in 2002, and they deteriorated when preferential treatment was abol-
ished in 2004. However, even here the employment effect is significant only for 
parts of the duration. This points to the advantage of using a duration model 
instead of a binary model estimated at a specific point of time in the unemploy-
ment duration. Differences in the results according to population groups are by 
no means implausible, since unemployment rates are different within these 
groups and the composition of unemployed workers differs between them. There 
is ample evidence that the effects of active labor market policies depend on the 
labor market situation.  
   
7 Robustness  
Adjusting for heterogeneity 
Changes in the composition of the groups compared in the DD estimation 
between the observation periods could potentially bias the results. Therefore, in 
addition to the estimators already discussed, we use estimators that condition on 
observed heterogeneity. The covariates used to reduce observed differences 
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between treatment and control group relate to the family situation (single, 
married or living with a partner, or lone parent), the qualification of the worker, 
previous work experience, and education. They are summarized in Table 3 
separately for the treatment and the control groups. With the exception of family 
situation, both groups of individuals do not exhibit substantial differences in 
composition.11  
An approach that combines the time variability of the unconditional DD 
estimator with the control for covariates is an estimation of the causal effect as 
difference of implicit baseline hazard rates. We first estimate a partial likelihood 
Cox proportional hazard rate model:  
   0( ) ( ) exp( ´ ).izλ τ = λ τ ⋅ γ   (3) 
The results are contained in table A1 in the appendix. The coefficients of the 
control variables influence employment chances comparable to other studies 
(Knight, 2002; Forslund et al., 2004; Caliendo et al., 2005). On the basis of the 
estimations, we then estimate the baseline survivor function 0
ˆ ( )S τ  for the 
treatment and control group and for the two time periods. From this, we derive 
the conditional DD effect analogously to equation (1):12  
    , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .C h t h t k t k tDD S S S S= = = =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤τ = τ − τ − τ − τ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (4) 
As before, a negative effect means an increase in the exit rate into employment 
since the effect rests on the baseline survivor curves.  
From Figures 9 and 10, the differences between conditional and uncondi-
tional estimates can be compared. While the results do not change qualitatively, 
the DDC effect has a smaller size than the unconditional DD effect over some of 
the duration for the 2002 results. In particular, the effect on survival is smaller 
towards the end of the observation period. Detailed results for the four population 
                                              
11  There is, however, a break between 2001 and 2002 in the share of individuals with previous job 
experience which is likely to be due to a change in the definition of the variable in the original 
data. 
12  Another conditional DD effect can be obtained from the interaction term between treatment 
indicator and the time dummy indicating before and after the policy change. This measure de-
pends on the assumption that the probability to exit into unemployment is constant during the 
observation period. We use the estimator based on the baseline survivor curve solely because it 
can be better compared to the unconditional estimates. 
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groups, however, show that the effect on East German women is hardly weak-
ened. Thus, the conclusions to be drawn from the results remain unchanged. For 
the 2004 natural experiment, there are no noticeable changes between conditional 
and unconditional results.  
Widening the age groups  
With only six months maximum difference in birth dates, age groups were 
chosen to be narrow in the estimations discussed so far. This is necessary 
because the labor market situation may evolve differently for different age 
groups. For instance, employers may be more hesitant to hire older workers as 
compared to younger workers in times of economic improvement because 
employment protection is often stricter for older workers, age being one criterion 
used in unjust-dismissal litigation and for social selection in cases of redundan-
cies in Germany. For this reason, the ages of individuals in the treatment and 
control groups should not be too distant.  
 A disadvantage of narrow groups is that the importance of crowding-out 
effects between treatment and control group may be higher (Van Reenen, 2004). 
Therefore, we also calculated the effects using broader age bands. In particular, 
we extend the treatment groups to individuals between 50 and 51 years, and the 
control group to workers aged 48 and six months to 49 and six months. The 
extension of the age group also checks for a second version of Ashenfelter’s dip 
(see section 6). There is a possibility that individuals well after their 49th 
birthday will not be hired if employers expect that a subsidy can be obtained after 
their 50th birthday. Thus, by concentrating on individuals aged 49, we may over-
estimate the effect of eligibility. 
 Results are contained in Figures 11 and 12. There are some changes over 
parts of the duration. However, exit probabilities among the narrow and wider 
age groups are virtually identical towards the end of the observation period. 
Thus, we conclude that our results are robust to changes in the definition of 
treatment and control groups. 
8 Conclusions 
In this study, we have used a natural experiment design to assess whether hiring 
subsidy programs lead to earlier exit from unemployment to employment in the 
group of eligible persons as compared to the situation in which no subsidies are 
available. We base our study on two changes in the eligibility criteria: the first 
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policy change extended potential program participation to older workers unem-
ployed for less than six months. The second policy change ended specific 
treatment of older unemployed above 50 years of age and made younger and 
older individuals equally eligible for subsidies.  
 We use a difference-in-differences estimator to examine the causal effect 
of eligibility. This estimator compares the change in the survival in unemploy-
ment during the first 180 days of unemployment of the treatment group in 
comparison to a control group of unemployed just below the age of eligibility. 
We show that the broadening of eligibility in 2002 increased the likelihood of 
exiting unemployment only for East German women. Consistent with this 
finding, the end of specific treatment of older workers in 2004 reduced the causal 
employment effect in this group. 
The results from an implementation study and evidence from previous lit-
erature strongly suggest the presence of deadweight effects. To estimate dead-
weight effects, we compared the number of estimated additional employment 
relationships to the estimated number of additional subsidies disbursed. The 
absence of positive employment effects for males suggests that the observed 
increase in subsidized employment is absorbed by deadweight effects. Con-
versely, as regards East German women, the effects on subsidy take-up and on 
employment are very similar in magnitude. Hence, deadweight effects are not 
important in this group. Robustness checks such as controlling for covariates and 
different definitions of treatment and control groups lead to similar results. 
Clearly, these results constitute only a first step towards a comprehensive 
evaluation of hiring subsidies. There remains the question of the persistence of 
the employment relationships that were initially subsidized. A major difficulty 
here is to form a suitable control group for program participants. Moreover, it is 
quite possible that additional employment merely substitutes employment cuts in 
other population groups. Since the absence of these substitution or displacement 
effects cannot be ascertained in a microeconometric study of individual workers, 
analyses at the firm or the regional level remain useful complements.  
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Figure 1: Employment contracts subsidized by Integration Supplements 
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Source: Federal Employment Agency, 
http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/detail/f.html 
 
 
Figure 2: Definition of observation periods 
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Figure 3: Estimated effect of widening eligibility, 2002 
 
Note: upper and lower curves are .95 confidence bands obtained by bootstrapping. 
 
Figure 4: Estimated effect of ending the program, 2004 
 
Note: upper and lower curves are .95 confidence bands obtained by bootstrapping 
 
  
Figure 5: Separate estimations for population groups, 2002  
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Note: upper and lower curves are .95 confidence bands obtained by bootstrapping. 
 
  
Figure 6: Separate estimations for population groups, 2004  
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Note: upper and lower curves are .95 confidence bands obtained by bootstrapping. 
 
  
Figure 7: Cumulative incidence function results for the 2002 experiment 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Cumulative incidence function results for the 2004 experiment 
 
  
Figure 9: Conditional and unconditional DD Estimates, 2002 
 
 
Figure 10: Conditional and unconditional DD Estimates, 2004 
 
 
  
Figure 11: Widening the age groups, 2002 
 
 
Figure 12: Widening the age groups, 2004 
 
  
Table 1:  Number of EGZ-subsidised hirings as a share of all   
unemployment spells 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Treatment Group 
(Age 50 to 
50+6 months) 
 
1.16 
(6209) 
3.72 
(7320) 
3.03 
(14406) 
 
0.94 
(16389) 
Control Group 
(Age 49 to 
49+6 months) 
 
0.82 
(6453) 
1.14 
(6947) 
1.25 
(14374) 
 
0.52 
(17181) 
Note: Number of individuals in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2:  Estimated survivor function 180 days after entry into 
unemployment 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Treatment Group 
(Age 50 to 
50+6 months) 
 
74.04 
(0.59) 
 
73.92 
(0.55) 
 
80.26 
(0.33) 
81.67 
(0.30) 
Control Group 
(Age 49 to 
49+6 months) 
 
72.21 
(0.59) 
72.93 
(0.57) 
79.95 
(0.34) 
 
80.79 
(0.30) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Means of independent variables 
Variable 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Groups Control   Treatment     Control   Treatment     Control   Treatment    Control   Treatment    
Married / living together 0.735     0.728 0.719     0.719 0.674     0.683  0.659     0.664 
Lone parent 0.025     0.023 0.032     0.028 0.039     0.034 0.047     0.042 
Job experience 0.946     0.951 0.813     0.830 0.867     0.872 0.873     0.877 
Unskilled worker 0.481     0.472 0.471     0.478 0.463     0.448 0.455     0.452 
Skilled worker 0.427     0.429 0.417     0.411 0.445     0.456 0.454     0.455 
Technical school degree 0.026     0.030 0.043     0.040 0.032     0.031 0.030     0.031 
Technical college degree 0.023     0.024 0.024     0.023 0.024     0.026 0.028     0.027 
University degree 0.042     0.046 0.045     0.047 0.036     0.039 0.036     0.034 
One child living in household 0.164     0.142 0.153     0.143 0.174     0.161 0.174     0.157 
Two children living in 
household 
0.071     0.054 0.065     0.059 0.076     0.069 0.088     0.070 
Three or more children living 
in household 
0.028     0.026 0.028     0.023 0.035     0.029 0.039     0.031 
Female 0.463     0.470 0.449     0.450 0.467     0.466 0.455     0.461 
Foreign national 0.151     0.151 0.139     0.135 0.114     0.110 0.119     0.109 
Note: All variables defined as dummy variables 
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Results from Cox estimation 
Variable 2002 2004 
Married / living together 1.12     (3.34) 1.44     (14.44) 
Lone parent 1.11     (1.03) 1.32     (4.53) 
Job experience 1.48     (7.56) 1.36     (8.81) 
Unskilled worker 1.20     (5.84) 1.38     (14.43) 
Technical school degree 1.01     (0.15) 1.29    (4.59) 
Technical college degree 0.73    (2.98) 0.99     (0.12) 
University degree 0.80    (2.84) 1.07     (1.13) 
One child living in household 0.99     (0.28) 0.96     (1.59) 
Two children living in household 1.09     (1.61) 0.88     (3.10) 
Three or more children living in household 0.86     (1.51) 0.74     (4.85) 
Female 0.70     (12.07) 0.71     (16.13) 
Foreign national 0.78     (4.65) 0.78     (6.11) 
Number of observations 23515 56772 
LR chi2(12) 362.10 944.94 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Notes: reference categories: single household; skilled worker, no children in the household. Estimation 
method: Proportional hazard. In parentheses: z-statistics estimated robustly. 
 
 
